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AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENERS: IN YOUR FACE AND
ABOVE THE LAW
LUKE STRIEBER*
IN VANDERKLOK V. UNITED STATES, the Third Circuit ad-dressed the issue of whether a First Amendment claim for re-
taliatory prosecution could be brought against an agent of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the context of
airport security screenings—a question of first impression.1 Any
action brought under the Constitution against a federal official
is known as a Bivens action.2 In Vanderklok, the Third Circuit de-
clined to extend the coverage of a Bivens action to include a
remedy against TSA screeners who retaliate against a traveler
who exercises their First Amendment rights.3
I. BACKGROUND
The case centers around an altercation involving a TSA
screener (Kieser) and a traveler (Vanderklok).4 After passing his
luggage through the security checkpoint, Vanderklok’s heart
monitor, concealed in a protective piece of PVC pipe, prompted
further screening from Kieser.5 According to Vanderklok, Kieser
was “disrespectful and aggressive” during this screening, so
Vanderklok informed Kieser of his intent to file a complaint.6
Kieser, however, maintained that Vanderklok was belligerent,
threw his hands in the air, and claimed that he could bring a
bomb through airport security at any point.7 Once the heart
* Luke Strieber is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2019, at SMU Dedman
School of Law. He received his B.A. in Economics from Princeton University in
2012.
1 Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2017).
2 Id. at 198.
3 Id. at 209.
4 Id. at 194.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 193.
7 Id. at 194.
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monitor was checked and the PVC pipe confiscated, Kieser
called the airport police to report that Vanderklok had made a
bomb threat.8 A police officer then approached and arrested
Vanderklok just five minutes after he requested the complaint
form.9 Vanderklok was then handcuffed and transported to the
police station where he awaited his appearance in court.10
At trial, Kieser’s testimony was found to be unreliable as the
surveillance footage did not corroborate his version of the
events, and Vanderklok was acquitted of all charges.11 Following
his acquittal, Vanderklok brought suit asserting a total of nine
claims against Kieser, the United States, the TSA, the City of
Philadelphia, and various police officers.12 The nine asserted
claims included violations of the First Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA).13
II. LEGAL HISTORY
The District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dis-
missed all claims against the United States, the TSA, the police
officers, and the City of Philadelphia, leaving Kieser as the sole
defendant.14 With respect to the First Amendment retaliatory
prosecution claim against Kieser, the district court concluded
that such a cause of action exists under the stipulations in Bivens
and that Kieser was not entitled to qualified immunity.15 The
Third Circuit heard the case on interlocutory appeal and ruled
on the issue of “whether Kieser ought to be immune from suit
for Vanderklok’s First Amendment retaliation claim, and, pre-
liminary to that, whether such a claim exists at all in the specific
circumstances of this case.”16
In response to the above issue, the Third Circuit declined to
extend a Bivens cause of action for First Amendment retaliation
in the specific context of airport security screeners.17 The court
determined that, while the Supreme Court had left open the
8 Id.
9 Id.




14 Id. at 196.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 198.
17 Id. at 209.
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possibility of implying a Bivens action under a clause of the First
Amendment and the Third Circuit itself had previously assumed
that a Bivens action extended to First Amendment claims, courts
in general should be weary of explicitly extending Bivens actions
to new contexts with new categories of defendants.18 The Su-
preme Court stated in Wilkie v. Robbins that in order for a Bivens
action to extend to a new context and class of defendant: (1)
there must be no alternative existing remedy for addressing the
grievance; and (2) “special factors counselling hesitation” must
not outweigh the benefit of authorizing a new kind of federal
litigation.19 In the case of airport security screeners, the Third
Circuit concluded that, although there was no alternative means
of redress for Vanderklok, national security concerns demanded
that the court not extend Bivens actions to this class of
defendants.20
III. THIRD CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
Prior to delving into a Wilkie analysis, Judge Jordan explained
how the expansion of Bivens actions into new contexts is strictly
limited.21 Since the original Bivens case created a private right of
action under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
further extended Bivens to Fifth and Eighth Amendment causes
of action in Davis v. Passman and Carlson v. Green, respectively.22
However, in the nearly forty years since those cases have been
handed down, the Supreme Court has never held that Bivens
extends to First Amendment claims.23 This lack of guidance has
left the lower courts to form their own opinions on the subject.
For example, the Third Circuit has implied a Bivens action
under the First Amendment for free speech rights and the de-
nial of prisoners’ rights.24 But, the court merely assumed that a
Bivens action could exist for a First Amendment right to be free
of government retaliation for speech without ruling on the is-
18 Id. at 199.
19 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
20 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 206.
21 Id. at 198.
22 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32–33 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
248–49 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
23 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200.
24 Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981) (implied Bivens action
for the denial of prisoners’ rights); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 870 (3d Cir.
1975) (implied Bivens action for a violation of free speech).
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sue.25 Judge Jordan also pointed out that recently “the Court has
made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfa-
vored’ judicial activity.”26 Acting upon that assumption and un-
derstanding that a Bivens action for a First Amendment violation
had not previously been extended in the context of airport se-
curity screeners, the Third Circuit was wary to extend it in this
case.
Proceeding to the Wilkie analysis, the court’s first step was to
determine whether there was any other means of redress for
Vanderklok. The three alternative avenues for Vanderklok were
(1) the FTCA; (2) state law liability; and (3) the Travel Redress
Inquiry Program (TRIP).27 First, under the FTCA, if a federal
employee commits a tort, the United States can be substituted as
a defendant.28 While the United States generally has sovereign
immunity, the FTCA provides for a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity when a federal employee commits a tort within the scope of
employment.29 However, if the federal employee commits an in-
tentional tort, he is not acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, and the United States’ sovereign immunity is reinstated.30
Since Kieser is a federal employee who committed an inten-
tional tort, sovereign immunity is reinstated and claims against
the United States fail. Under this specific fact scenario, the only
way a suit against Kieser could proceed is if Kieser, as an airport
security screener, is classified as an “investigative or law enforce-
ment officer.”31 While some TSA agents are law enforcement
personnel, Kieser was not because he was not: “(1) authorized to
carry and use firearms; (2) vested with the degree of the police
power . . . ; and (3) identifiable by appropriate indicia of author-
ity.”32 Second, after concluding that the FTCA did not provide a
remedy, the court ruled that, because Kieser’s tortious conduct
was intentional and was not within the scope of his employment,
there was no state law claim against the government or Kieser.
Third, because TRIP was intended to provide a means for trav-
25 George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 585 n.24 (3d Cir. 2013).
26 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848
(2017)).
27 Id. at 201–05.
28 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2012).
29 Id. § 2679(d)(1).
30 Id. § 2680(h).
31 Id. § 2680(h).
32 49 U.S.C. § 44903(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
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elers to contest their placement on the “no fly list,” it did not
apply to Vanderklok’s case either as he was not on a no-fly list.33
Next, the court analyzed whether there were any special fac-
tors counseling hesitation.34 In this case, a special factor is that
imposing liability upon airport security screeners implicates na-
tional security concerns.35 The court recognized that “[t]he Su-
preme Court has never implied a Bivens remedy in a case
involving the military, national security, or intelligence.”36 The
judicial branch has been especially reluctant to decide a case
involving national security when the remedy is “money damages
rather than a claim seeking injunctive or other equitable re-
lief.”37 Further, the Third Circuit believed that the duty of air-
port security screeners was “so significant” and “of high
consequence” that the judicial branch should decline to impose
a remedy in this situation. Instead, the court concluded that
Congress should handle the “balancing of priorities” between
national security and the protection of constitutional rights of
United States citizens.38 Although other courts have implied a
Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation claims,39 the
Third Circuit, in this case, held that such a Bivens cause of action
should not be made available against airport security screeners.
IV. WHY THE COURT GOT IT WRONG
The Third Circuit declined to extend Bivens in this case for
three reasons: first, the duties of TSA screeners implicate na-
tional security concerns;40 second, Congress is in a better posi-
tion than the courts to evaluate a “new species of litigation[;]”41
and third, TSA agents are not given sufficient training to hold
them to a standard of probable cause.42 However, these con-
cerns are overstated and are not critical enough to justify deny-
ing a constitutional right to free speech in this context.
33 Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 205 (3rd Cir. 2017).
34 Id. at 205–09.
35 Id. at 206 (quoting Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
36 Doe, 683 F.3d at 394.
37 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017).
38 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 209 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863).
39 Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 2013); Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp.
Sec. Admin., No. 09-5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014),
amended on reconsideration, 2014 WL 3952936 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2014).
40 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 206.
41 Id. at 208 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007)).
42 Id. at 209.
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While it is true that courts have often declined to intervene in
matters of national security and that this case presents special
security concerns, generic security concerns cannot be used as
an excuse to deny all constitutional protections at an airport.
Other courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized
this and have allowed a constitutional claim to proceed even
though the issue at hand related to national security concerns.43
Because “national security” is not a magic word that can be ut-
tered to avoid deciding a case, any court analyzing a First
Amendment claim in this context must look at the specific detri-
ment to national security allegedly threatened.
In this case, the concern is that a Bivens remedy might chill
the fervent screening practices of TSA screeners. When distilled
to a specific form, the claim in this context is no different than
the concern whenever a Bivens action is implied by a court.44
Since the Bivens action was created in 1971, federal officers have
had to weigh personal liability against national security when
making split-second decisions.45 There is no reason to believe
that Bivens liability would uniquely chill an airport security
screener from performing their duties. By declining to imply
Bivens in this context, the Third Circuit has undercut every past
Bivens implication given that all implications revolve around the
same concerns.46 This is an unnecessary result since courts in
the past have assumed that Bivens extends to First Amendment
claims.47 Further, precedent dictating judicial discretion in the
realm of national security has revolved around concerns that the
judiciary would interfere with the decisions of the executive
43 See, e.g., Tobey, 706 F.3d at 393 (“We . . . are therefore unwilling to relinquish
our First Amendment protections—even in an airport.”); see also Ziglar, 137 S. Ct.
at 1862 (“[N]ational-security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward
off inconvenient claims.”).
44 Linlor v. Polson, No. 1:17CV13, 2017 WL 2955520, at *5–*7 (E.D. Va. July
11, 2017).
45 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[P]olice officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”).
46 Linlor, 2017 WL 2955520, at *6.
47 Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014).
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branch.48 However, this case only tangentially relates to the ex-
ecutive branch and its decision to set up the TSA.49
The Third Circuit next contended that the Supreme Court
has laid down a precedent of deference to Congress in cases
involving Bivens claims and national security. The court relied
on Ziglar v. Abbasi, where illegal aliens challenged their confine-
ment conditions pursuant to “high-level executive policy” in the
wake of 9/11.50 Following Ziglar’s logic, the Court reasoned that
Congress is in a better position to put a remedial scheme in
place and, because the remedial scheme circumscribed by Con-
gress in the context of airport security screeners does not in-
clude a private right of action for First Amendment violations,
the courts should not overstep their boundaries and permit new
litigation.51 However, Ziglar is inapplicable here because it dealt
with “high-level policies” that would draw Congressional atten-
tion and make it less likely that Congress’s silence was inadver-
tent.52 In the principal case, the TSA-damages framework is not
at the same level of executive detention policies, and therefore,
the congressional silence does not warrant the same level of def-
erence. Further, the Supreme Court indicated that the availabil-
ity of an alternate-damages framework was of “central
importance” when deciding whether or not the judiciary should
intervene.53 Unlike in Ziglar, Vanderklok’s case involves a scena-
rio in which “it is damages or nothing.”54 It is true that the Su-
preme Court has cautioned courts when dealing with high-level
policy decisions involving a remedial scheme evidencing clear
intent of Congress or the executive, but Congressional silence in
the context of First Amendment damages for airport security
screeners should not stop the judiciary from protecting constitu-
tional rights.55
48 See, e.g., Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861 (stating that implying a Bivens action
“would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive functions of
the Executive Branch”); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(cautioning that deciding the case “would require a court to delve into the mili-
tary’s policies regarding the designation of detainees as ‘security internees’ or
‘enemy combatants,’ as well as policies governing interrogation techniques”).
49 Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 207 (3rd Cir. 2017).
50 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
51 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208.
52 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862.
53 Id.
54 Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
55 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 379–80 (1983).
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Finally, the court feared that instituting a Bivens action may
unfairly subject TSA agents to litigation they are not adequately
trained to avoid.56 If a Bivens action were instituted in the con-
text of TSA screeners, and those screeners were sued under the
First Amendment, they would be free from liability if their ac-
tions, as alleged, were supported by probable cause.57 The Third
Circuit reasoned that because TSA screeners are not trained in
the issues of “probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and other
constitutional doctrines,” it would be unfair to impose such a
standard on them.58 However, the court also recognized the “in-
herent uncertainty surrounding the probable cause standard.”59
In fact, the Supreme Court has often remarked that “probable
cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.”60 Police and other
officers of the law frequently have to wager between their lives
and their job when making split-second decisions revolving
around that same common-sense standard. The gravity of the
decisions they are confronted with while on the job warrant the
need for training on probable cause. It is apparent that during
the formation of the TSA, Congress did not envisioned TSA
agents making decisions of the magnitude that would warrant
probable cause training because it did not designate them as
special agents or officers nor equip them with firearms.61
It would be unfair to impose the probable cause standard of
“reasonable caution” on TSA agents not designated as officers
without training when interacting with individuals in the course
of their employment.62 There are minimal marginal benefits in
training in an inherently uncertain standard such as probable
cause.63 These marginal benefits are worthwhile to protect those
who place their lives on the line for the safety of others; how-
ever, they are not important enough to justify the limitation of
constitutional rights.64
56 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208.
57 See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 257 n.5 (2006).
58 Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208–09.
59 Id. at 209.
60 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
61 See Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208.
62 See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
63 See Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 209.
64 See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is well understood that “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional viola-
tions.”65 The Third Circuit decided that national security con-
cerns, deference to Congress, and an unfair result trumped
constitutional rights in this case. However, the TSA fails in its
duties ninety-five percent of the time.66 Giving a government
agency such as the TSA unbridled leeway to infringe on consti-
tutional rights is akin to taking medicine that blinds you but has
a five percent chance of stopping a heart attack. To trade a con-
stitutional right for an ineffective safety measure goes against
the fundamental principles of freedom that the nation was built
upon. Benjamin Franklin warned that “[t]hose who would give
up essential Liberty to purchase a little temporary Safety, de-
serve neither Liberty nor Safety” with a case such as this in
mind.67
65 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
66 Andrew Blake, TSA Failed to Detect 95 Percent of Prohibited Items at Minneapolis
Airport: Report, WASH. TIMES (July 6, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2017/jul/6/tsa-failed-detect-95-percent-prohibited-items-minn/ [https://
perma.cc/E6EC-E5Y9].
67 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 6, at 242 (Leonard
W. Labaree ed., 1963).
